














A critical oversight in the authors’ (Birch et al.) UAL framework arises in its stated basis in 
an “unlimited heredity” (UH) argument. Specifically, the foundational UH claim is that there 
is a possibility space constrained by the known properties of DNA, and that, within that 
space, a subset of specific “real” lineages arise. These lineages are actualisations of 
possibilities, under the assumption that no amount of time would be sufficient to actualise all 
possibilities. The oversight – already present in UH, but ‘inherited’ by UAL – regards what 
pressures produce the actual subset of lineages from the in principle possible lineages. 
Significantly, the subset is neither due solely to the “constraints” granted by Birch et 
al., nor is it arbitrary. Rather, the subset of actual lineages is the result of a reciprocal process 
with the environment that has been highlighted in research on the Extended Evolutionary 
Synthesis (EES) (e.g. Laland et al. 2017). In this commentary, we will underscore how this 
critical oversight concerning reciprocal pressures poses a core problem for the target article’s 
characterisation of UAL. 
To begin with, we note that plants are indisputably lifeforms, according the criteria set 
forth in Birch et al., and plants of course share the Earth with animals. To the authors’ credit, 
their argument does not reflexively locate the transition marker for UAL and consciousness 
between plants and animals. Instead, they take a principled approach, by first claiming that a 
certain kind of learning – UAL – should be transition marker for consciousness, and then 
attempting to explore where we might find such learning by organisms. 
On the other hand, even with a “UAL appears no later than” escape clause, their 
rhetoric suggests an impoverished view of plants: e.g., “Can we find a property that requires 
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[the] hallmarks of consciousness, yet is possessed by a wide range of non-human animals?”; 
“UAL […] can tell us which animals are conscious, but it does not aspire to tell us which are 
not”; “which animals are capable of UAL?”. This zoocentric attitude readily obscures the 
ways in which plants meet many criteria that are typically assumed to be unique to animals 
(Linson and Calvo 2020). The authors’ self-imposed selection bias is not only problematic in 
theory, but also substantially limits the proposed empirical tests of their predictions, based on 
“neural signatures”, psychophysics, etc. 
To describe UAL, Birch et al. offer a list of “enhanced forms of associative learning” 
– hypothesised to comprise a “natural cluster” – while granting that these forms have fuzzy 
boundaries and do not logically imply each other. Instead, they may be observed to be 
working together in organism behaviour within “realistic ecological settings”. Crucially, 
however, “realistic ecological settings” are not a mere backdrop against which organism 
action unfolds. The authors maintain that lineages were evolving to occupy newly discovered 
niches – a viewpoint entrenched in the Modern Synthesis that has not taken on board the 
insights about niche construction developed in EES. Specifically, there is a constant two-way 
interaction and mutual reshaping of organism and niche, which affects not only lifespan, but 
also lineage (Laland et al. 2017). This brings us back to the relevance of the fact that animal 
and plant lifeforms share the same planet. 
Birch et al. hypothesize that associative learning must have been a major driving force 
behind the rapid animal diversification during the ‘Cambrian explosion’, when animal life 
emerged and flourished on dry land 542–488 million years ago. But terrestrial life is not 
exclusively animal. The Cambrian explosion has a parallel in the evolution of a solar-energy-
harvesting lineage that includes aquatic green algae, and gave rise to land plants (the algae 
may have become terrestrial before the advent of plant roots; see Harholt et al. 2016). Land 
plants emerged and flourished in the early Devonian period, circa 400 million years ago, 
when the main body of some land plants started to lignify, becoming woody, and the root-
shoot/leaf polar morphologies found in higher plants became settled (Calvo 2017). There is 
no reason to exclude the possibility that forms of learning similar to those of animals were 
among the driving forces behind the rapid plant diversification during that period. 
There is certainly a basis in the empirical literature on plants to entertain the idea that 
not only are the key features of UAL found in plants, but also the requirements for UAL 
(Birch et al., Figure 3). An increasing body of research suggests that there are plant 
counterparts of UAL features and requirements characterizable in cognitive and behavioural 
terms. Plant-level and inter-plant communication takes place customarily; the capacity to 
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discriminate kin from non-kin is present in plants too. Plants can weigh different stimuli and 
prioritise their responses according to different needs. Plants are able to choose between 
alternative courses of action, engaging in complex decision-making that calls for the 
integration of multiple informational sources, allowing them to implement different strategies 
for nutrient foraging. Plants exhibit behaviours that are anticipatory and goal-directed (Raja 
et al. 2020). (For a thorough review see Calvo et al. 2020; 2021; Segundo & Calvo 2019; 
2021.) 
We have space to consider a few more specific points here. For instance, while Birch 
et al. recognise that “a food source can suddenly acquire a nearby predator”, they somehow 
overlook that the adaptive behavioural response may point to fixed survival priorities, rather 
than flexibility. They implicitly concede (in their section on false alarms) that there is no 
sense in getting nourishment from food if only to perish by predation moments later – better 
to survive hungry for a bit and get food later. In this regard, it hardly seems that formed value 
associations are being “rewritten” in such cases, in line with their elaboration of UAL 
features. Following the authors’ examples, the flexibility they seek is found in plants: a plant 
might have roots growing upward in the soil, to reach a nutrient-rich patch, until it breaks 
through the soil to the surface, where bare roots are harmed by sunlight. It then ‘learns’ to 
grow its roots downward instead. For other plants nearby, the nutrient-rich soil may extend in 
parallel to the surface, so they ‘learn’ to grow their roots outwards.  
Perhaps such plant responses are adequately flexible but not quick enough (see 
feature #5). Yet, given the central role of lifespan in UAL, shouldn’t quickness be treated as a 
relative measure? Or, are we to use the same standard of quickness for insects that live just 
one day and trees that live hundreds of years? With respect to ‘false alarms’ in plants, over-
reacting due to over-learning may explain the evolution of ameliorating mechanisms specific 
to plants, analogous to those Birch et al. consider in the case of animals (e.g., plant stress 
responses in terms of an increase in levels of overall phenotypic integration) (Calvo, 
Gagliano, Souza & Trewavas 2020; Calvo & Trewavas 2020). 
But one needn’t slow down for plants across the board. Another UAL feature (#4) 
concerns the “escape from immediacy”, learning “how stimuli that are no longer present 
relate to current stimuli”. In rain forests, under-canopy trees steadily orient their foliage 
towards future sunfleck patterns, in ways that show extrapolation from past patterns. 
Returning to our opening point, the “unlimited” attribute, whether of heredity or 
associative learning, as Birch et al. acknowledge, is constrained. But what they do not 
acknowledge is that these possibility spaces are not merely constrained, they are actively 
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shaped by pressures that appear to undermine the very promise of being unlimited. 
Organisms are in constant interaction with their local environment, and their complexity as 
alleged “experiencing systems” must be tailored to their concrete needs (Mediano et al. 
2021). 
Despite the zoocentric framing of their proposed experimental tests, Birch et al. 
concede that the distribution of UAL might be larger, and are thus open to the possibility that 
future experiments confirm the existence of UAL in some other taxa/phyla. Can experiments 
be devised to empirically measure plant forms of learning (Baluška et al. 2018) that would 
meet UAL expectations? Existing experimental studies exploring associative learning in 
plants report mixed results (see Adelman 2018 for the review). Most of these studies have 
been carried out in 1960-70s and lack sufficient experimental rigor. Gagliano et al. (2016) 
provide the most recent evidence of associative learning in pea plants. However, the one and 
only recent attempt to replicate it has not succeeded and remains contested as of today 
(Markel 2020a; Gagliano et al. 2020; Markel 2020b). Replication studies of Gagliano et al.’s 
results are needed (Abramson & Chicas-Mosier, 2016). More recently, the model plant 
Arabidopsis thaliana has been reported to exhibit aversive conditioning (Bhandawat et al., 
2020), but this, too, awaits independent replication.  
Overall, there is not enough conclusive empirical evidence to either accept or rule out 
what would amount to UAL in plants. Current experimental research at MINTLab aims to 
find out whether plants are responsive enough to coaching to meet or surpass basic 
associative learning. At least we are in agreement with the authors about one key point, in 
line with their recognition that molluscs and annelids have been insufficiently studied. 
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